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THE QUEST FOR REASONABLE RETAIL ENERGY PRICES IN EUROPE: 
POSITIVE AND NORMATIVE DIMENSIONS 
 
DESPOINA MANTZARI* 
 
Abstract 
Public opinion in various EU Member States increasingly perceives energy prices as 
unreasonable. Primarily owing to distributional concerns, state interference with the liberalised 
retail energy market is ever-present across many EU Member States, despite its implications for 
the development of competitive (national and EU) energy markets. Rather than solely engaging 
with the conditions of state intervention as such, this article takes a step back and argues that an 
appreciation of what constitutes a reasonable price for energy supply is a necessary prerequisite 
in determining the relevance, scope and conditions of state intervention in retail energy prices. In 
the absence of a definition of the concept in secondary legislation, it offers a novel conceptual 
framework centred on the contextual interpretation of “a reasonable price for energy supply”. 
The article offers two understandings of reasonableness: one underpinned by the principle of 
market competition and the other understood as affordability. It elaborates on the different set of 
conditions and criteria against which they are judged and it explains how these have informed 
various instruments enshrined in the energy liberalisation directives for achieving reasonable 
prices for end-consumers. These range from consumer empowerment measures to more direct 
consumer protection measures informed by affordability concerns. After providing a taxonomy of 
the latter instruments, it examines their respective advantages and disadvantages by focusing on 
how these are perceived by the EU framework. Its broader aim is to contribute to a more nuanced 
understanding of what is meant by a “reasonable retail energy price” within the context of 
national and EU competitive retail energy markets and explore how the resulting tension between 
the two understandings of reasonableness is accommodated in the broader EU constitutional and 
institutional context. 
                                                        
* Lecturer in Law, University of Reading. Email: d.mantzari@reading.ac.uk. I thank Ioannis Lianos, Chris 
Hilson, Maria Ioannidou, an anonymous reviewer as well as participants at the 9th IMEDIPA Conference 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past decade, retail energy prices (electricity and gas) in several EU Member 
States have generated a considerable amount of public and political debate and justifiably 
so. Household energy bills have typically increased in recent years raising concerns in 
relation to energy affordability.1 In the EU, on average household electricity prices have 
increased more than 4% a year for the last five years2 – an increase above inflation – 
while for industrial consumers they have increased by about 3.5% a year.3  For gas, 
household prices have risen 3% a year, again above inflation, for most Member States.4 
Moreover, while almost all Member States have seen a consistent rise in the consumer 
prices of electricity and gas, the differences between different national prices remain 
large: “consumers in the highest priced Member States are paying 2.5 to 4 times as much 
as those in the lowest priced Member States”.5 This has led to the unfortunate situation 
where consumers in many EU Member States, especially in hard-pressed households, 
struggle to pay their energy bills. Increasingly, public opinion perceives the prices paid 
for keeping the lights and heating on as unreasonable. 
Given the above, it is timely to consider the underexplored question of what 
constitutes a reasonable price for electricity and gas in the current EU paradigm of 
liberalized retail energy markets. As things stand today, the level of retail prices is no 
longer the province of the government or the regulator, as was the case when state-
owned, vertically integrated monopolies dominated national energy markets, but is 
determined by the degree of competition between energy supply companies.6 Though the 
                                                        
1  See VaasaETT, “European Residential Energy Pricing Report” (2014) available at 
<http://www.energypriceindex.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/08/European-Residential-Energy-Price-
Report-2014.pdf > (last visit 10 October 2017). 
2 COM(2014) 21/2, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Energy Prices and Costs in 
Europe”, at 14. 
3 Ibid., 5. 
4 Ibid., 5. 
5 Ibid., 4. 
6 The liberalization took place in three phases: In the first phase, the retail market opened to facilitate 
energy supply to large-scale, industrial end-users and from 1 July 2004, to all non-household customers, 
see Art. 19 of Directive (96/92/EC) of 19 December 1996 concerning common rules of the internal market 
in electricity, O.J. 1996, L 27/20 and Art. 18 of Directive (98/30/EC) of 22 June 1998 concerning common 
rules for the internal market in natural gas, O.J. 1998, L 204/1. During the second phase, as the result of the 
Second Energy Package, the energy sector opened up for all end-users, including household customers 
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EU energy acquis repeatedly refers to the objective of ensuring reasonable prices for 
electricity and gas, the concept is not defined anywhere in the text of the energy 
liberalisation directives. Nor do the directives contain a set of criteria against which one 
can judge the reasonableness of energy prices. For example, should a price be deemed 
reasonable solely in relation to the underlying wholesale costs or should one also take 
into account the consumer’s willingness and/or ability to pay? And, which type of 
consumer, given the different images of energy consumers enshrined in the energy 
directives (i.e. household customers, industrial customers, vulnerable consumers)?7 
The question is also significant given the ever-present political interest in the level of 
energy prices manifested, inter alia, by the pervasiveness of retail price regulation in 
several EU Member States;8 despite ambitions that retail energy liberalization would 
reduce state interference in the energy market.9 For example, in the UK, which has led 
the way in the EU in terms of energy market liberalization, the pursuit of reasonable 
prices has led to controversial proposals, such as an energy price freeze,10 and other 
short-term regulatory interventions11  with – often – unintended consequences.12  Such 
                                                                                                                                                                     
since 1 July 2007, see Art. 2 (12) and 21 of Directive (2003/54/EC) of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in electricity and repealing 
Directive (96/92/EC), O.J. 2003, L 176/37 and Art. 2 (28) and 23 of Directive (2003/55/EC) of the 
European Parliament and the Council 26 June 2003 concerning common rules for the internal market in 
natural gas and repealing Directive (98/30/EC), O.J. 2003, L 176/57. Retail competition is strengthened by 
virtue of the Third Energy Package provisions that are currently the applicable law, see Directive 
(2009/72/EC) of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for 
the internal market in electricity and repealing Directive (2003/54/EC), O.J. 2009, L 211/55 (hereinafter 
referred to as “Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC”) and Directive (2009/73/EC) of the European Parliament 
and the Council of 13 July 2009 concerning common rules for the internal market in natural gas and 
repealing Directive (2003/55/EC), O.J. 2003, L 211/94 (hereinafter referred to as “Gas Directive 
2009/73/EC”). 
7 See Lavrijssen, “The Different Faces of Energy Consumers: Toward a Behavioral Economics Approach”, 
10(2) JCL&E (2014), 257-291. 
8 See ACER/CEER, “Annual Report on the Results of Monitoring the Internal Electricity and Gas Markets 
in 2015” (November 2016) available at: 
<http://www.ceer.eu/portal/page/portal/EER_HOME/EER_WORKSHOP/CEERERGEG% 
20EVENTS/CROSS_SECTORAL/ACER_CEER_MMR_2016/Event%20Information>, at p. 46 (last 
accessed 10 October 2017). 
9 Prosser, Nationalised Industries and Public Control (Blackwell, 1986). 
10 Ed Miliband, 2013, “Labour would freeze energy prices” 24th September 2013, 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-24213366 (last visit 19 May 2017). For a criticism see C Waddams, 
“Price Regulation is not the Solution to Unaffordable Energy Prices” (CCP Blog post 2013) available at 
<https://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2013/09/25/price-regulation-is-not-the-solution-to-unaffordable-
energy-prices/> (last visit 10 October 2017). 
11 See e.g. in the UK context, the prohibition of regional price discrimination through Standard Licence 
Condition SLC 25A in 2009. 
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interventionist measures recently resurfaced during the UK election campaign, with the 
UK Conservative party suggesting an absolute price cap on standard variable tariffs.13 
“[T]he irresistible urge to meddle”14 with the energy retail market is primarily owing to 
post-financial crisis inequality concerns and broader distributional concerns: while 
competition may be the best way to ensure the lowest average prices and the highest 
quality for consumers on average, it is a process that barely guarantees any equality of 
outcome–there will be “winners” and “losers”; assuming, of course, that there is 
sufficient competition. Those consumers who loose from the competitive process may not 
be “empowered” enough to engage with the market and switch to better deals and/or may 
be “vulnerable”, and thus not “protected” enough. It has always been difficult to 
distinguish between these two categories, not least because, as we shall see, disengaged 
consumers often exhibit characteristics of vulnerability. 
Against this backdrop, this article argues that before embarking on a normative inquiry 
around the appropriateness and nature of state intervention in retail energy prices, one 
should first appreciate what precisely constitutes a reasonable price for energy supply. 
For a better understanding of the concept in all its variations is crucial for determining the 
relevance of state intervention as well as the proper scope of the various instruments 
provided by the EU energy acquis for achieving reasonable prices. 
In the absence of a definition of the concept in secondary legislation, the article offers 
a novel conceptual framework centred on the contextual interpretation of “a reasonable 
price for energy supply”. In particular, the framework is informed by the overarching 
objectives and underlying principles of the EU energy acquis, as well as by the broader 
constitutional significance of energy supply as a service of general economic interest 
                                                                                                                                                                     
12  For an analysis of the anticompetitive effects of the SLC 25A see Hviid and Waddams, “Non-
Discrimination Clauses in the Retail Energy Sector” 122 (562) The Economic Journal (2012), 236; 
Waddams Price and Zhu, “Pricing in the UK Retail Energy market, 2005-2013”, CCP Working Paper 13-
12 (2013) available at <http://competitionpolicy.ac.uk/documents/107435/107587/13-
12+Waddams+and+Zhu+(Final).pdf/6d49a6ed-b489-4603-a19e-890f6a098acc> (last visit 10 October 
2017). 
13  See “How Would the Tory Energy Price Cap Work?” 9 May 2017, available at 
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-39694183> (last visit 10 October 2017). 
14  Helm (2016), “Regulatory Credibility and the Irresistible Urge to Meddle”, available at 
<http://www.dieterhelm.co.uk/regulation/regulation/regulatory-credibility-and-the-irresistible-urge-to-
meddle/> (last visit 10 October 2017). 
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(“SGEI”). 15  An important caveat is that, in doing so, the article focuses on the 
reasonableness only of the retail energy component of the bill.16 This consists of the final 
energy price and retail mark-ups. 
The conceptual framework put forward offers two shades of reasonableness that sit at 
the confluence of two distinct, yet related objectives of the EU energy acquis: the 
competition objective and the underlying principle of economic efficiency on the one 
hand, and that of ‘high standards’ of public service and consumer protection (especially 
for vulnerable customers) informed by the principle of social solidarity. The first 
objective gives rise to an economic understanding of reasonableness, whereby a 
reasonable price is linked directly with the benefits of competition. In this context, it is 
almost synonymous with the economic concept of an efficient price. The second one 
gives rise to a broader understanding of reasonableness that encompasses non-economic 
and non-competition law considerations. Unlike the first shade of reasonableness, it 
necessitates state intervention so as to further a broader range of regulatory objectives 
that lie beyond the realm of competition policy and are not in principle achieved by 
competitive markets. In this context reasonableness hinges on the notion of an affordable 
price.17 
The article elaborates carefully on these two distinct “logics” that govern price 
reasonableness, their different set of conditions and criteria against which they are judged 
and it explains how these have informed various instruments enshrined in the energy 
liberalisation directives for achieving reasonable prices for end-consumers. These range 
from consumer empowerment measures to more direct consumer protection measures 
informed by affordability concerns, such as retail price regulation, subsidies and tax 
exemptions. After providing a taxonomy of the latter instruments, it then examines their 
respective advantages and disadvantages by focusing on how these are perceived by the 
EU framework; all being imperfect options. This exercise generates some valuable 
                                                        
15 The supply of energy has been listed as a SGEI. See Case C-393/92, Municipality of Almelo and Others, 
EU:C:1994:171, paras. 46-48 and Case C-159/94, Commission v France, EU:C:1997:501, para. 57. 
16 There are three essential components which contribute to the end-user price: i) the energy component; ii) 
the network component and iii) the taxes and levies component. The energy component that concerns us 
here, consists of the wholesale element of prices, which normally reflects the costs incurred by companies 
in delivering energy to the grid and the retail element of prices that covers costs related to the supply of 
energy to final consumers (e.g. sales, billing, meter-reading). 
17 Recitals 26 and 27 of Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC. 
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insights into the way the EU framework accommodates the disparate domestic regulation 
within the internal energy market and the concomitant tension between the two shades of 
price reasonableness. It will be shown that in doing so it is guided by the overarching 
normative principle of “market participation”, first laid down by the ECJ in the 
Federutility ruling,18 which has far-reaching implications for the nature, scope and limits 
of state intervention in national energy markets. 
By drawing links between existing scholarship in the fields of energy law, competition 
law and consumer law and borrowing insights from economics, the article departs from a 
mere positive analysis of the conditions of retail price regulation and various other 
consumer protection measures to ensure reasonable prices, that has, with a few 
exceptions,19 dominated the limited scholarship in the area.20 The comprehensive and 
original conceptual framework offered instead serves to better inform both the positive 
and normative dimensions of the quest for reasonable prices in the EU. 
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the economic understandings 
of reasonableness informed by the objective of market competition. Section 3 explores 
the non-economic and non-competition law understandings of reasonableness informed 
by considerations of social solidarity and the ECJ’s “market participation” guiding 
principle. Section 4 examines how the latter, broader understanding of reasonableness has 
informed the EU’s “affordability” instruments and offers taxonomy thereof. Section 5 
examines the respective advantages and disadvantages of all instruments for delivering 
reasonable prices in all its various dimensions, as these are perceived by the EU 
framework. Finally, Section 6 offers some concluding observations. 
                                                        
18 See e.g. Case C-265/08, Federutility et al v Autorita per l’energia elettrica e il gas, EU:C:2010:205, 
paras. 18–19.  
19 Pront-van Bommel, “A Reasonable Price for Electricity” 39 J. Consum. Policy (2016) 141-158. 
20  See Fischerauer and Johnston, “State Regulation of Retail Energy Prices: An Anachronism in the 
Liberalized EU Energy Market” 9 JWELB (2016), 458-474, Bartl, “The Affordability of Energy: How 
Much Protection for the Vulnerable Consumers?” 33 J. Consum. Policy (2010) 225-245. 
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2.  Economic understandings of reasonableness 
 
The economic understanding of a reasonable retail energy price derives from the 
neoclassical economics 21  paradigm of a competitive market, according to which all 
market actors (producers and consumers) act in a rationally manner that enables them to 
maximize their utility or profit. The primary goal of a competitive market is to provide an 
efficient allocation of resources. As will be explained below, according to the economic 
understanding, a reasonableness of a given retail price is judged against the benchmark of 
a competitive market price. 
The economic understanding of reasonableness is relevant to our purposes here 
because the competitive market paradigm features prominently in the energy 
liberalization directives. Specifically, Article 3(1) of the Electricity Directive 
2009/72/EC22 and the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC23 states that energy undertakings must 
be operated with a view to achieving a “competitive market”. In the same vein, the ECJ 
has consistently held that the principle presumption of the rules on the internal energy 
market is the development and maintenance of competitive markets.24 The significance of 
the free operation of the market mechanism has been widely embraced by the EU Courts, 
which have highlighted that the EU energy acquis entails “the freedom to determine the 
price for the supply of electricity”.25 This in turn gives rise to the fundamental principle 
of market-based retail energy price formation. In other words, the price for the supply of 
energy should be first and foremost the result of market forces and not one set by the 
State–the market forces being policed via the ex post application of competition law. 
Within the context of neoclassical economics, there can be said to be two overarching 
objectives of a competitive market. The first is that of maximizing economic efficiency 
through ensuring that goods are allocated to those who are willing to pay the most for 
                                                        
21  Neoclassical economics applies the tools of welfare economics to a benchmark based on perfect 
competition. It assumes, inter alia, many buyers and sellers none of which enjoys market power. This 
approach takes cost and demand curves as given and focuses on equilibrium where price equals marginal 
cost. See e.g. Mankiw & Taylor, Economics (3rd ed, Thomson Learning, 2014), ch. 3. 
22 O.J. 2009, L 211/55. 
23 O.J. 2003, L 211/94. 
24 See e.g. Case C-265/08, Federutility et al v Autorita per l’energia elettrica e il gas, EU:C:2010:205, 
paras. 18–19.  
25  See e.g. Case C-242/10, ENEL Produzione SpA v Autorita per l’energia elettrica e il gas, 
EU:C:2011:861, para. 42. 
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them (allocative efficiency) and that goods are produced at the lowest possible cost 
(productive efficiency). The second is that of maximizing consumer choice through 
encouraging the entry into the market of competing suppliers. Both are reflected in the 
electricity and gas directives. Recital 1 to both directives recalls that the internal energy 
market aims to deliver “real choice” for all consumers and achieve “competitive prices”. 
This is further enunciated in Article 12 and Article 33(1)(c) of both directives as well as 
Recital 3, which provides that all customers must be enabled to buy energy from the 
supplier of their choice and all suppliers should be free to deliver to their customers 
(“eligible customers”). Moreover, Member States are required to stimulate competition 
by creating an environment conducive for market entry. 
But it is worth pausing for a second and reflecting on what competition entails and its 
implications for determining whether a given price is a reasonable price. Taking a static 
perspective of competition, the free operation of the price formation mechanism is of 
vital importance to the effective and efficient functioning of competitive markets. Prices 
should be determined by the interaction of levels of supply (producers) and demand 
(consumers) in a market. The price determines what is produced and who is willing to 
pay for it, and vice versa. In such a context, prices provide incentives to both consumers 
and producers. Lower prices discourage production, but encourage consumption by 
consumers. High prices, on the other hand, encourage more production of a good or 
service, but also force consumers to reflect on their willingness to pay for a good or 
service that in turn reduces consumption. The good or service is therefore being allocated 
to those consumers who value it the most, as measured by their willingness to pay for it. 
These different signalling effects that the price formation mechanism generates push the 
price to balance the forces of consumption and production – what economist call an 
“equilibrium”, where price equals marginal cost. 
The operation of the supply and demand mechanism, besides being the natural 
consequence of economic forces, provides the most efficient economic outcome possible, 
in the sense that satisfaction for society (total surplus) is maximized at minimum cost. 
According to the textbook understanding of the operation of competitive markets, a 
reasonable price is an efficient price. In such setting, the price is equal to cost including a 
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normal profit or return on capital employed, for the last unit produced. 26  Hence, 
according to an economic logic, the reasonableness of a supplier’s price in a competitive 
energy market would be judged by examining the relationship between the retail price 
and the actual cost of the product and whether this gives rises to excessive profits against 
the benchmark of the efficient (competitive market) price.27 In the case of retail energy 
supply, that concerns us here, the costs that suppliers can directly control are their 
operating costs (e.g. sales costs, billing costs, meter-reading costs, central service costs) 
and retail mark-ups, the so-called energy component of the bill. Margins are realized by 
covering the various costs suppliers face in supplying gas and electricity to achieve a 
surplus. This is their pre-tax margin out of which suppliers make their profit. 
Accordingly, this is the only component over which customers can exert some discipline 
by switching supplier. By contrast, suppliers have limited control over network 
transmission and distribution costs that remains closely regulated by the EU energy 
acquis. 28  Suppliers have also limited control regarding wholesale costs that are 
principally determined by global commodity prices, though they do hedge gas and 
electricity which may result in them incurring costs which turn out to be either above or 
below the market price at the time of delivery. Finally, suppliers have limited control 
over the various social and environmental costs29 they incur in response to discharging 
government-led initiatives that are to be recovered through consumer bills. Hence, when 
considering price reasonableness according to purely economic considerations there are 
both direct and indirect costs facing suppliers to be taken into account. 
According to the economic logic of price reasonableness, several other conditions 
must exist both on the supply side of the market and the demand side so as market forces 
                                                        
26 For an analysis see Littlechild, “The CMA’s Analysis of the Retail Energy Market: An Examination 
Using Textbook Economics”, Energy Policy Research Group (Cambridge, 2017) available at: 
<http://www.eprg.group.cam.ac.uk/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/1703-Text_1.pdf> (last accessed 10 
October 2017), pp.4-6. 
27 Ibid. 
28 See e.g. Art. 32 of Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Gas Directive 2009/73/EC concerning the 
regulation of network tariffs. 
29 In the UK context, government environmental programmes designed to give energy companies targets 
for reducing carbon emissions are administered by the regulator, Ofgem. These include the Energy 
Company Obligation (ECO) for promoting energy efficiency of domestic households, the Renewables 
Obligation, for promoting large-scale renewable electricity projects, and Feed-in Tariffs that support the 
switch from oil and gas fired heating systems to sustainable sources of energy. See 
https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/64006/householdenergybillsexplainedudjuly2013web-pdf 
(last accessed 10 October 2017). 
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to produce reasonable retail prices. First, there should be sufficient incentives for 
productive efficiency and innovation. Second, the natural monopoly markets for 
transmission and distribution should be properly regulated and sufficiently separated 
(unbundled) from the competitive markets of generation and supply so as to prevent 
cross-subsidy and market manipulation.30 Third, there must be a credible threat of losing 
customers via switching or a credible threat of market entry that will erode profits. 
Finally, for the threat to be credible there need to be low barriers to entry and well-
informed, empowered consumers able to engage with the market and switch to more 
efficient suppliers. In fact, active consumer participation in the market is the ultimate 
factor for reasonable prices to be realised, according to the economic understanding. This 
is because lack of consumer engagement with the energy market can give suppliers a 
position of unilateral market power concerning the inactive body of customers, which are 
then able to exploit through pricing practices, as the recent investigation by the UK 
Competition and Markets Authority (“CMA”) into the UK retail energy market 
illustrated.31 
In fact, consumer empowerment measures, that aim to enable consumer participation 
in the market so as to stimulate competition between energy suppliers, feature now more 
prominently in the EU energy acquis,32 as well as in the broader EU policy discourse.33 
Crucially, the Third Energy Package prioritizes, as will become apparent in the following 
sections, consumer empowerment,34  rather than direct consumer protection measures, 
such as retail price regulation, so as to bring about reasonable prices. In doing so, it has 
also taken on board behavioural insights into consumer behaviour in energy markets, 
                                                        
30 See Ch. IV, Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Ch. III, Gas Directive 2009/73/EC and Regulation 
(EU) 1227/2011 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2011 on wholesale energy 
market integrity and transparency, O.J. 2011, L 326/1. 
31  CMA (2016), “Energy Market Investigation: Final Report”, available at: 
file:///Users/denimantzari/Desktop/final-report-energy-market-investigation.pdf (last accessed 10 October 
2017), para. 9.283. 
32 See COM(2015), “A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking Climate 
Change Policy” (25 February 2015), at 11. COM(2015), “Energy Union Package – Roadmap for the 
Energy Union”, at 3; COM(2015), “Delivering a New Deal for Energy Consumers” (15 July 2015). 
33 COM(2007), “EU Consumer Policy Strategy 2007–2013”, at 5; COM(2011), “Single Market Act-Twelve 
Levers to Boost Growth and Strengthen Confidence”, para. 2.4. 
34 See Annex 1 of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. For an analysis see 
Johnston, “Seeking the EU ‘Consumer’ in Services of General Economic Interest” in Leczykiewicz and 
Weatherill (Eds.), The Images of the Consumer in EU Law: Legislation, Free Movement and Competition 
Law (Hart, 2016). 
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which demonstrate that even if switching opportunities exist consumers are far from 
rational. 35  For example, empirical research suggests that consumers tend to have a 
preference for the status quo.36 Such behaviour, otherwise known as “status quo bias”, is 
brought up to explain situations whereby consumers fail to investigate alternative energy 
contracts that may be more beneficial to them. Hence, Member States are required to put 
in place arrangements to ensure that consumers are assisted through the provision of clear 
and user-friendly information about their rights, especially the right to switch supplier, 
the content of the supply contracts and their energy consumption. Regarding the latter, 
smart meters are in the process of being rolled out for more accurate metering that 
combined with price comparison tools can facilitate switching,37 although their cost to the 
energy consumer should not be underestimated.38 We shall return to this point later, as 
the ability of consumers to participate in the retail energy market has served, as we shall 
see, as an overarching normative principle for mediating between the two shades of 
reasonableness. 
Having elaborated on the main preconditions and conditions governing price 
reasonableness from an economic standpoint, the following section will explain how the 
latter shade of reasonableness differs from the broader understanding of reasonableness 
informed by considerations of social solidarity. 
 
3. Beyond economic reasonableness: Reasonableness as affordability 
 
At the opposite end of the economic logic of price reasonableness, lays a broader 
understanding of reasonableness informed by non-economic and non-competition law 
considerations. Whereas the economic understanding of price reasonableness is informed 
by the principle of economic efficiency, the broader understanding of reasonableness, that 
                                                        
35 See Mc Fadden, “Free Markets and Fettered Consumers” 96(1) Am. Econ. Rev. (2006) 3-29; Waddams 
Price and Zhu, “Empirical Evidence of Consumer Response in Regulated Markets” 12(1) JCL&Econ. 
(2016) 113-149; Lavrijssen, op. cit. supra note 7. 
36 Pollitt and Shaorshadze, “The Role of Behavioral Economics in Energy and Climate Policy”, ESRC 
Electricity Policy Research Group (Cambridge, 2011). 
37 New Deal for Energy Consumers, op. cit. supra note 32, at 3-5. 
38 European Commission (Joint Research Centre), “Smart Metering Deployment in the European Union”, 
available at: <http://ses.jrc.ec.europa.eu/smart-metering-deployment-european-union> (last accessed 10 
October 2017). 
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concerns us here, is informed by considerations of social solidarity.39 In this context 
reasonableness hinges on the notion of affordability. Affordability is referred to in the EU 
energy acquis as one of the defining elements of services of general economic interest 
(along with those of continuity, universality, equality and transparency), whereas “high 
levels of affordability” feature also in the new Protocol No 26 on Services of General 
Interest (inserted by the Treaty of Lisbon) among the “shared values of the Union” in 
respect of services of general interest.40 However, the concept is nowhere defined as such 
in the EU acquis. 
Turning to the literature, it is frequently referred to as the ability of consumers to pay 
for a minimum level of a certain service.41 At the heart of the issue lies the distinction 
between “willingness to pay” and “ability to pay”. The latter is observed through an 
analysis of the size of energy bills and the proportion of overall spending as part of 
income, while the former is best assessed through an analysis of the “willingness to pay” 
(usually through dedicated consumer surveys). That is the maximum amount a consumer 
is willing to pay for energy – a proxy for how much the consumer values the good. 
Within the context of an optimal allocation of resources, those who would value most the 
good should be assigned to it. However, consumers who are willing to pay the 
equilibrium price may not afford the good at such a price. What is more, because average 
cost per unit declines as consumption rises, those poorer consumers may be paying more 
as a proportion of household income than wealthy ones who consume greater quantities. 
Thus, their ability to pay prevents them from taking decisions according to their 
willingness to pay. 
Though affordability can be achieved via various instruments, as the following section 
will illustrate, the common denominator is that they all involve a departure from the 
                                                        
39 For a general account see Barnard, “EU Citizenship and the Principle of Solidarity” in Dougan and 
Spaventa (Eds.), Social Welfare and EU Law (OUP, 2005), p. 157. See further Prosser, “Regulation and 
Social Solidarity” 33(3) J. Law and Soc. (2006) 364-387 and Szyszczak, “Public Service Provision in 
Competitive Markets” 20(1) YEL (2001) 35-77. 
40 Protocol No 26 on Services of General Interest, Art. 1. 
41 To this effect see UK Regulators Network, “Understanding Affordability Pressures in Essential Services” 
(20 January 2015) available at: <http://www.ukrn.org.uk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/07/2015JanUnderstandingAffPressuresInEssSer.pdf> (last visit 10 October 2017). 
See further Fankhauser and Tepic, “Can poor consumers pay for energy and water? An affordability 
analysis for transition countries” EBRD Working Paper (May 2005) available at: 
<http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/wp0092.pdf> (last visit 10 October 
2017). 
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purely economic rationales for public intervention in markets, summarized in the concept 
of ‘market failure’, so as to achieve a socially, rather than economically desirable 
outcome. Such outcome is reflected in the concept of an “affordable price”. Hence, 
affordability should not be conflated with the outcome of a competitive market, as 
misguidedly been stated.42  On the contrary, affordability necessitates, in principle, a 
departure from cost-reflective prices set by the market mechanism. 
Considerations of social solidarity become relevant to our understanding of 
reasonableness as affordability because of the nature of the service being offered. The 
provision of energy supply in a given society is crucial in realizing its territorial cohesion 
and stability. Energy undertakings carry out activities, which are essential for the 
functioning of the society and on which many other activities depend. There are also 
important for social cohesion, as being cut off from electricity would amount to social 
exclusion. Hence, social solidarity considerations, in the form of social and territorial 
cohesion, underpin our understanding of reasonableness as affordability. 
Social solidarity is reflected in the Preamble to the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights 
as one of the founding values of the “ever closer Union” and in Chapter IV. It further 
informs the EU energy acquis objective of ensuring “high standards of universal and 
public service” and the protection of “final consumer”, especially the “vulnerable” one, in 
the context of liberalized energy markets, from which stem various instruments for 
pursuing affordability. To better appreciate its normative connotations, one should dig 
into the intellectual roots of the concept, which are to be found in the French legal 
concept of service public43 (public service) that has in turn profoundly influenced the 
EU’s approach towards services of general economic interest. As developed by the 
French public law scholar Léon Duguit, the concept of service public prescribed that any 
type of state intervention into society could only be legitimized by its function “to protect 
the necessary preconditions for social interdependence and interaction’”,44 i.e. to serve 
the needs of society (service public). In light of this conceptualization, the notion of 
                                                        
42 See Bartl, op. cit. supra note 20, at 228. 
43 Schweitzer, “Services of General Economic Interest: European Law’s Impact on the Role of Markets and 
of Member States” in Cremona (Ed.), Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union 
(OUP, 2011), pp. 11-62. 
44 Duguit, Traité de droit constitutionnel, tome II (1928) } 8, 61 and 70–1 in: Schweitzer op. cit supra note 
43, p. 13. 
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service public represents the state’s commitment to social solidarity and prescribes the 
basis and limits of state action. However, as Heike Schweitzer discusses, the meaning of 
the service public eventually shifted over time within the French École de service public 
from representing the basis and limits of state’s legitimacy to actually making the public 
interest the binding goal of the state, leading to an expansion of state’s activities. “[T]he 
state is defined by its task to represent the public interest; but defining the public interest 
is within the free discretion of the state.”45 
Understanding the notion of social solidarity as it finds its expression in the 
continental legal concept of service public is crucial for our purposes here as it underpins 
the main instruments of consumer protection enshrined in Article 3(1) of the energy 
liberalization directives 2009/72/EC and 2009/73/EC, that of Universal Service 
Obligations (USOs) and Public Service Obligations (PSOs). Each will be examined in 
turn. 
USOs intend to guarantee the supply of electricity at “reasonable prices” to those who 
cannot afford it at the market price.46 They, hence, represent the broader concept of price 
reasonableness underpinned by social solidarity, as they depart from cost-reflective 
pricing prescribed by the economic understanding of reasonableness, to allow for 
redistributive pricing.47 Redistributive pricing is achieved by imposing on one or more 
firms an obligation to supply energy to all consumers on a non-discriminatory basis, i.e. 
regardless of any variations in the cost of supplying different groups. Distribution is 
directed to high-cost service customers who, if market forces alone operated, they would 
simply not be served as it would be uneconomic to do so, let alone offered an affordable 
price. Hence USOs intends to socialize the costs of energy supply that in the era of state-
owned monopolies were addressed through cross subsidization. Although in principle 
economic efficiency considerations might exist for imposing USOs,48 in practice their 
imposition relates to non-efficiency objectives such as social solidarity and the desire to 
prevent social exclusion. 
                                                        
45 Schweitzer op. cit. supra note 43. 
46 See Micklitz, “Universal Services: Nucleus for a Social European Private Law” in Cremona (Ed.), 
Market Integration and Public Services in the European Union, (OUP, 2011), ch 3. 
47 For an economic perspective see Cremer et al, “Universal Service: An Economic Perspective”, 72 Annals 
of Public and Cooperative Economics (2001) 5-43, p. 14. 
48 In the case of telecoms, for example, where USO can be a remedy for a network externality. 
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USOs should not be conflated with PSOs.49 The latter are broader in their scope and 
may involve not only USOs, but also security of supply and environmental objectives 
and, most relevant for our purposes here, price regulation. As affordable energy supplies 
are essential to end-uses, the directives allow Member States to depart from the 
constitutional imperative of “open and undistorted competition” upon which the internal 
market is premised, and impose PSOs on undertakings operating in the energy sector with 
respect to inter alia the price of electricity supply.50 Such PSOs stem from the fact that 
energy supply constitutes a service of general economic interest, a rather elusive and 
constantly evolving EU concept,51 on the basis of which Member States can by virtue of 
Article 106(2) TFEU, derogate from the Treaty rules, in particular those on competition, 
so as to address the impact of liberalization on consumers. Such obligations must be 
clearly defined, transparent, non-discriminatory and guarantee equality of access for 
undertakings to national customers. 52 On the basis of this provision, Member States have 
sought to regulate retail energy prices so as to address “unreasonable prices” generated 
by the market mechanism, although in practice justifying this intervention proves to be 
difficult due to the ECJ’s insistence on construing it narrowly, as we shall see below. 
This implies that Article 3(2) should be interpreted against the background of Article 
106(2) TFEU and the corresponding case law of the ECJ, including the Court’s 
application of the proportionality requirement.53 The requirement of proportionality has 
always been the most contentious, as it involves a delicate balance between market and 
non-market considerations, which in itself raises normative questions about the 
                                                        
49 See Sauter, Public Services in EU Law 15 (CUP 2015), p.15 
50 Article 3(2) Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC. The Gas Directive 2009/73/EC does not provide for such a 
price-related obligation, but mentions in Recital 47 that EU citizens and small enterprises should be able to 
enjoy public service obligations, in particular with regard to reasonable tariffs. 
51 See for example, COM(2003), “Green Paper on Services of General Interest”; “Communication from the 
Commission on the application of the European Union state Aid rules to compensation granted for the 
provision of services of general economic interest” O.J. C. 8/4, para. 45. See further Lenaerts, ‘Defining the 
Concept of “Services of General Interest” in light of the “Checks and Balances” Set Out in the EU 
Treaties’, 19(4) Jurisprudence (2012) 1247-1267; Sauter, “Services of General Economic Interest and 
Universal Service in EU Law” 33 E. L. Rev. (April 2008) 167-193. 
52 See Art. 3(2) of Electricity Directive 2009/72 EC and Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. 
53 See Deruytter & Vandendriessche, “State Regulation of Supply Prices for Electricity and Gas: The 
Federutility Case”, in: Roggenkamp and Hammer (Eds.), European Energy Law Report IX, (Intersentia, 
2012), p. 35. 
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institutional capability and legitimacy of the judiciary to undertake such task.54 This is 
not the place to explore the ECJ’s long line of case law on the proportionality 
requirement.55 Suffice it to say-for present purposes, that while on the basis of Article 14 
TFEU and Article 4 (2) TEU, Member States enjoy a broad discretion in defining and 
organizing their SGEI by virtue of their proximity to citizens (soft version of 
proportionality), 56  this margin is significantly narrowed, whenever sector-specific 
legislation incorporating SGEI is enacted at the EU level (strict proportionality of the 
least restrictive alternative).57 It is thus the latter, stricter, form of proportionality that is 
relevant to our analysis. 
However, experience of the energy sector suggests that EU Member States have 
considerable freedom to determine the scope and contents of public service obligations 
and are allowed to take national circumstances and policy objectives into account.58 In 
fact, because of the poor clarification of the concept of PSO at the EU level and the lack 
of EU competence to design social policy in the field of energy, let alone a clear basis for 
energy until the Treaty of Lisbon,59 Member States have been acting as gap-fillers in the 
EU policy, defining national solutions to counteract the impact of liberalization. The 
permissive approach is, however, subject to a strict degree of supervision by the 
European Commission for the possible effects of the measures on national competition. It 
is also complemented by the duty of the NRAs to monitor the level and effectiveness of 
market opening and competition at the retail level, including prices for household 
customers.60 
The Directives, however, remain silent as to the rationae personae of PSOs relating 
to the price of supply. For example, can large energy suppliers benefit from such 
                                                        
54 See Cruz, “Beyond Competition: Services of General Interest and European Community Law” in de 
Búrca (Ed.), EU Law and the Welfare State: In Search of Solidarity (OUP, 2005), ch.6. 
55 See e.g. Case 155/73, Sacchi, EU:C:1974:40, paras. 14-18; Case 66/86, Ahmed Saeed Flugreisen and 
Others v Zentrale sur Bekampfung unlauteren Wettbewerbs, EU:C:1989:140, paras. 55-58; C-41/90, 
Klaus Höfner and Fritz Elser v Macrotron GmbH, EU:C:1991:161, para. 25; Case C-320/91, Corbeau, 
EU:C:1993:198; Case C-393/92, Almelo, EU:C:1994:171; Case C-157/94, Commission v Netherlands 
EU:C:1997:499. See further Cruz, op. cit. supra note 54. 
56 See e.g. Case C-320/91, Corbeau. 
57 See Cruz, op. cit. supra note 54. 
58 Hancher and Larouche, “The Coming Age of EU Regulation of Network Industries and Services of 
General Economic Interest” in Craig and De Burca (Eds.), The Evolution of EU Law (OUP, 2011), p. 777. 
59 Art. 194 TFEU. 
60  See Art. 37 of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Art 41 of the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC, 
respectively. 
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regulation? Does reasonableness as affordability apply to them? Or is it the narrow logic 
of economic reasonableness applicable in this case? To this effect, the ECJ has played an 
important role, not only in mediating between the two shades of reasonableness, but also 
in providing an overall normative principle guiding the Member States’ choices as to 
when and how to depart from economic reasonableness. The normative principle is 
captured in the so-called “market participation” test implicitly adopted by the Court. In 
other words, the ECJ’s approach is predicated upon an assessment of the consumers’ 
ability to participate in the retail energy market and act as empowered consumers able to 
search, assess and act upon the information presented to them so as to attract better deals. 
While initially introduced with the aim of regulating the discretion Member States enjoy 
when determining the scope and content of PSOs, in practice the “market participation 
test” as regulated by the principle of proportionality, has far-reaching implications that 
extend beyond merely prescribing the conditions of retail price regulation. Properly 
understood, it provides yet another intellectual foundation, along with that of social 
solidarity, for moving beyond the narrow conception of price reasonableness. If active 
consumer participation in the market is the ultimate factor for reasonable prices to be 
realised, according to the economic approach, limited ability to participate in the market 
provides a normative rationale for embracing the broader logic of price reasonableness. 
The following subsection will explore in greater detail the “market participation” test 
before delving further into its implications in Section 5. 
 
3.1 Moving beyond economic price reasonableness: The ECJ’s “market participation 
test” 
The “market participation” test was first laid down in the Federutility ruling, where the 
CJEU was presented with the opportunity to consider the legality of retail price 
regulation under the energy liberalisation directives.61 The Court paid specific attention to 
the rationae personae of the measures and advanced a context-sensitive test that 
encompasses pragmatic considerations of the ability of consumers to achieve fair prices 
through the market mechanism. The ruling concerned an Italian law adopted few days 
before 1 July 2007, when full libersalisation was supposed to take place, which allocated 
                                                        
61 Case C-265/08, Federutility. 
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to the regulator (Autorità per l’energia elettrica e il gas) the power to define “reference 
prices” that the distributors or suppliers of gas within the scope of their PSOs were bound 
to incorporate in their commercial offers to final customers. These de facto binding prices 
were set at levels below market prices. The purpose of this rule was to protect the final 
consumers of gas against excessive prices and, therefore to guarantee their right to a 
universal service, including reasonable and affordable energy prices. The applicants 
argued that the regulation of gas prices violated the then Gas Directive 2003/55/EC.62 
The national court in its preliminary reference asked whether maintaining in effect the 
power of the NRA to set reference prices is contrary to the EU law or whether it could be 
allowed due to particular circumstances of the market, still characterized by an absence of 
‘effective competition’. 
At the outset, the ECJ pointed out that Article 3(2) of the Gas Directive enables the 
Member States to accommodate two competing interests. On the one hand, it seeks to 
promote the Directive’s objective of establishing a “competitive market in natural gas”. 
On the other hand, it seeks to reassure the Member States that liberalization will not be to 
the detriment of consumers. Accordingly, when having recourse to Article 3(2), NRAs 
must strive to accommodate these two competing interests. Then the Court laid down 
some detailed guidance as to how that balance had to be struck, in the sense of the way 
the principle of proportionality should be applied, so as to ensure retail energy price 
regulation complies with the Directive. 
First, the intervention should be justified in the general economic interest.63 The Court 
held that the then Directive 2003/55 EC allowed Member States to assess whether and in 
the general economic interest it was necessary to impose PSOs upon undertakings 
operating in the gas sector. Second, Member States should comply with the principle of 
proportionality.64 In essence, proportionality entails that the intervention should not to go 
beyond what is necessary to achieve the objective that is being pursued in the general 
economic interest and should be limited to the price component influenced by the specific 
circumstances, but not to the final end-users’ price. 65  Furthermore, the intervention 
                                                        
62 O.J.2003, L176/57. 
63 Case C-265/08, Federutility, para. 25 
64 Ibid,, paras, 35; 38; 43. 
65 Ibid., para.38. 
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should be transitory in nature with limited duration and subject to periodic re-
examination at close intervals by the relevant regulatory authority. Thirdly, the ECJ stated 
that the “requirement of proportionality must also be assessed with regard to the scope 
ratione personae of the measures and more particularly its beneficiaries”.66  In other 
words, when assessing whether a specific national measure is proportionate, account has 
to be taken of differences between the position of undertakings and the position of 
household consumers and also of objective differences in size between the undertakings 
themselves.67 In contrast to Advocate General Colomer,68  the ECJ held that the Gas 
Directive does not in principle exclude the possibility that the undertakings irrespective 
of their size as final consumers of gas benefit from the PSOs which Member States may 
adopt in the context of Article 3(2) of that Directive, but they should not benefit in an 
identical manner as household and small enterprises. 69  Hence, price measures will 
generally need to make a distinction between households and undertakings as energy 
consumers, otherwise identical treatment of different categories of consumers has to be 
justified. Finally intervention should comply with the criteria set out under Article 3(2) of 
the Directive, namely that the PSOs must be “clearly defined, transparent, non-
discriminatory and verifiable”, as well as guaranteeing equal access for companies to 
consumers.70 
The Federutility principles were confirmed in the Enel case, 71  which involved a 
decision by the Italian regulatory authorities to regulate certain electricity generating 
installations that could be designated essential for the provision of dispatching and 
balancing services. The legislation imposed upon those undertakings the obligation to 
submit bids on the national electricity markets in accordance with the limits and criteria 
laid down by the electricity transmission and distribution system operator. The latter 
prevented undertakings from freely determining the remuneration for such bids. The ECJ 
examined the national rules in question and in particular the conditions under which 
Member States may intervene by imposing PSOs – in this case, for guaranteeing the 
                                                        
66 Ibid., para.39. 
67 Ibid., para. 42. 
68 Opinion of A.G. Colomer in C-265/08, Federutility, EU:C:2009:640. 
69 Case C-265/08, Federutility, para. 41 and 43. 
70 Ibid., para. 47. 
71 Case C-242/10, Enel Produzione SpA v Autorità per l'energia elettrica e il gas, EU:C:2011:861. 
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reliability of the system and for protecting consumers – drawing upon and confirming the 
Federutility principle that the EU energy acquis entailed “the freedom to determine the 
price for the supply of electricity”.72 It then applied the conditions for imposing PSOs, in 
a way largely comparable to that in the Federutility case. The main difference between 
the Enel and the Federutility case relates to the Court’s application of the proportionality 
principle, as it included an explicit testing of whether the measure was suitable, taking 
into account the specific features of the electricity market, including inflexible demand 
for a product that cannot be stored.73 
Similarly, in Commission v Poland, 74  in an infringement decision against Poland 
concerning an obligation imposed on all energy undertakings to submit to the President 
of the Energy Regulation Agency for prior approval the supply tariffs for gas, the ECJ 
found fault with the proportionality principle, as the scope rationae personae was found 
too broad in its coverage. No explanation was given as to why different types of customer 
groups ought to be treated similarly with regard to benefiting from regulated prices. 
Specifically, the Court emphasized that no distinction was made between final industrial 
customers and traders within the category of non-household residential clients. 
Furthermore, the duration of the scheme seemed permanent, rather than subject to regular 
review. 
Finally, in Anode,75 the Court made clear that the French Conseil d’Etat would have to 
assess whether the limitation of retail price regulation to households and small and 
medium-sized enterprises was proportionate to the security of supply and territorial 
cohesion objectives claimed by the French Government. The Court again referred to the 
lack of time limits for the duration of the regulated prices, the need to focus on the 
relevant cost component that would affect supply security/and or territorial cohesion and 
the need to justify the scope ratione personae of the measure, which covered smaller 
business and households.76 
                                                        
72 Ibid., para 42. 
73 Ibid., para. 57. 
74 Case C-36/14, Commission v Poland, EU:C:2015:570. 
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In all the above cases, while the ECJ did not elaborate on the reasons why the situation 
of industrial undertakings differs from that of household consumers, when delineating the 
scope rationae personae of the PSOs, it is evident that their ability to participate in the 
market played a crucial role. 77  Hence, measures that fail to differentiate among the 
different categories of customers cannot be considered a proportionate restriction of the 
principle of market-formed retail energy prices. 
 
4. Pursuing affordability: A taxonomy of the different instruments 
 
The foregoing discussion explored the two distinct “logics” of reasonableness that inform 
the concept of “reasonable price for energy supply” and elaborated on their underlying 
principles, conditions and criteria according to which they should be judged. It also 
brought to the fore that two alternative mechanisms exist for pursuing reasonable prices, 
that of competition and its corollary of consumer empowerment and that of state 
intervention in the form of consumer protection measures. Understanding reasonableness 
as affordability also allowed us to draw some preliminary observations on the relevance 
and conditions of state intervention in retail energy markets, as prescribed by first, the 
concept of service public and the conceptual frameworks of USOs and PSOs deriving 
thereof and second, by the ECJ’s “market participation” test. 
The purpose of this section is to further explore how the broader understanding of 
reasonableness translates into different affordability instruments enshrined in the EU 
energy acquis and offer a taxonomy thereof. It will be shown that the pursuit of 
reasonableness as affordability is far more complex than one may have anticipated, as it 
presupposes an appreciation of both the different images of the energy consumer and the 
multifaceted nature of consumer vulnerability. 
Instruments for achieving affordable prices can be distinguished according to two 
different criteria. First, according to whether they are implemented within the market 
(e.g. retail price regulation) or outside the market context (e.g. social welfare measures). 
Second, according to their scope rationae personae, i.e. their beneficiaries. In the latter 
case, they may be of a general application, if they focus on a broadly defined category of 
                                                        
77 Fischerauer and Johnston op. cit. supra note 20, p. 469. 
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consumers, such as household consumers or of a targeted application, if they focus on a 
narrowly specified category of consumers, such as vulnerable consumers. Instruments of 
general application include the provision of USO, expressly reserved, as we shall see 
below, for household consumers and retail price regulation through the imposition of 
PSOs relating to the price of supply, but, as we discussed in the previous section, under 
strict conditions of necessity and proportionality, advanced in the ECJ’s “market 
participation” test. Instruments of targeted application seek in principle to address the 
needs of vulnerable consumers and may relate to price regulation in the form of social 
tariffs,78 direct subsidies and general social welfare measures. 
It immediately becomes apparent that a proper engagement with the instruments of 
general application presupposes an appreciation of the various and multiple consumer 
‘images’. 79  In the same vein, measures of targeted application necessitate an 
understanding of the various images of consumer vulnerability. The remainder of this 
section will first discuss the different images of consumers, as these derive from the 
energy liberalization directives, as this category-based understanding has informed the 
scope of measures of general application, that is retail price regulation through the 
imposition of USOs and PSOs. It will then examine the concept of consumer 
vulnerability and how its different variations inform measures of targeted application, 
such as social tariffs and subsidies. 
 
4.1 Instruments of general application: Retail price regulation through the imposition 
of USOs and PSOs 
 
Before examining the beneficiaries of retail price regulation through the imposition of 
USOs and PSOs as an instrument of general application, we should first appreciate the 
various and multiple consumer images, as these are enshrined in the liberalization 
directives. This is crucial, as the category-based approach to distinguishing the different 
faces of energy consumers adopted by the Directives has informed the scope of USOs 
                                                        
78 Indeed, the Directives explicitly allow price regulation addressed specifically to vulnerable consumers. 
See Art. 3(7) of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Art. 3(3) of the Gas Directive 2009/72/EC, 
respectively. 
79 See e.g. Recitals 24-29 of Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. 
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and PSOS. In the context of retail energy supply that concerns us here, the Directives use 
the term “final customer”, who refers to the customer purchasing electricity for his or her 
own consumption, and by adopting a categorical approach they distinguish between 
“household customers”, where special attention is paid to the so-called “vulnerable 
consumers”, and “non-household customers”, where special reference is made to “small 
and medium-sized enterprises” (namely enterprises with fewer than 50 occupied persons 
and an annual turnover or balance sheet not exceeding EUR 10 million).  
State intervention in the form of USOs is expressly reserved for household customers 
(and where Member States deem appropriate, small enterprise80). The Directive 2009/72 
EC furthermore provides that the PSOs, including that of universal service, and the 
common minimum standards that follow therefrom, need to be further strengthened to 
make sure that all customers, especially vulnerable ones, are able to benefit from 
competition and fair prices.81 It is inferred from the above, that it is unclear to what extent 
Member States can remove retail price regulation if they cannot fulfil the Directive’s 
mandate to guarantee reasonable prices for all household customers and in some cases for 
small enterprises. 
Regarding PSOs relating to the price of supply, while EU law contemplates price 
regulation, it imposes some rather strict conditions regarding its application, as the 
previous section illustrated in great deal. Most crucially for our purposes here, while 
PSOs qualify as a measure of general application, identical treatment of different 
categories of consumers, such as household customers and industrial customers, has to be 
justified in line with the “market participation” test. However, while the ECJ departed to 
an extent from the category-based approach to energy consumers found in the energy 
directives, by essentially acknowledging that “some consumers are more equal than 
others,” when it comes to their engagement and participation in the market, it did not 
distinguish between “vulnerable” and “non-vulnerable” consumers within the category of 
household consumers. Distinguishing the two is crucial for implementing instruments of 
targeted application, to which the next subsection turns to. 
 
                                                        
80 See Article 3(2) of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. 
81 See Recital 47 and 50 to Gas Directive 2009/73/EC. 
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4.2 Instruments of targeted application and the multifaceted nature of consumer 
vulnerability 
Instruments of targeted application lie at the core of the reasonableness as affordability 
paradigm, as their rationae personae concerns those consumers who are vulnerable or 
live in energy poverty. They may involve measures implemented within the market (e.g. 
social tariffs) or outside the market (e.g. general social welfare measures, energy 
efficiency measures) The legal basis for such measures is to be found in Article 3(8) of 
the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC: 
 
Member States shall take appropriate measures, such as formulating national 
energy action plans, providing benefits in social security systems to ensure the 
necessary electricity supply to vulnerable customers, or providing for support for 
energy efficiency improvements, to address energy poverty where identified, 
including in the broader context of poverty. Such measures shall not impede the 
effective opening of the market set out in Article 33 or market functioning and shall 
be notified to the Commission, where relevant, in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 15 of this Article. Such notification may also include measures taken 
within the general social security system.82 
 
In exploring the different instruments, however, it is important to appreciate first that 
consumer vulnerability may come in different forms and second, that it is distinct from 
the situation energy poverty. Indeed, it is important that the two concepts are not to be 
conflated, as each invites different measures so as to ensure affordable prices. 
On the basis of subsidiarity, it is left to the Member States to define the concept of 
vulnerable customers, which may refer to “energy poverty and, inter alia, to the 
prohibition of disconnection of energy to such consumers in critical times”.83 Member 
States have opted for different definitions, implicit and explicit, of the concept of 
vulnerable consumers. 84 Implicit definitions refer to concepts of vulnerable consumers, 
which are an integral part of the national legislations without being put into specific 
wording. Other Member States have introduced an explicit definition, whereby legislation 
                                                        
82 See also Art. 3(4) of the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC.  
83 See Art. 3(7) of the Electricity Directive 2009/72/EC and Article 3(3) of the Gas Directive 2009/73/EC, 
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84 ACER/CEER, op. cit. supra note 8. 
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clearly identifies specific segments of the population that are considered vulnerable due 
to their characteristics or living conditions. These commonly relate to low-income 
households, the elderly or people in bad health. Very few, however, take into account 
single parents or those in debt. In some Member States, exceptional circumstances such 
as unemployment are covered.85 EU law respects these national definitions even if they 
produce divergences that may lead to market segregation. 
Norbert Reich’s typology of consumer vulnerability allows us to better appreciate its 
multifaceted nature.86 According to Reich, vulnerability comes in three different forms: i) 
physical disability; ii) intellectual disability and iii) economic disability.87 While physical 
disability is quite self-explanatory, intellectual disability is far more complex. Reich 
employs Griggs’ definition which regards as intellectually disabled ‘those persons who 
have limited rights and resources to exercise the range of choices possible in a given 
consumer market.’ 88  Developing this definition further it may be said to refer to 
difficulties ‘cop[ing] with the requirements of the modern consumer society’.89 For 
example, it may relate to difficulties in gathering and processing information and gaining 
access to advice and support. Such barriers to consumer empowerment may make it, in 
turn, difficult for consumers to find energy contracts best suited to their situation, or may 
lead to exclusion from technological innovations, such as the development of smart 
meters, smart grids, and demand response programs.90 Finally, economic disability may 
stem from the difficult economic situation of the consumer and relate to unemployment, 
illness and other unforeseen circumstances.91 
                                                        
85 See Deller and Waddams, “Affordability of Utilities’ Services: Extent, Practice, Policy. Research Paper 
3: Policies Used to Tackle Utility Affordability in Different Member States”, (CERRE, 22 October 2015) 
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These understandings are largely reflected in the Commission’s interpretive note on 
retail markets.92 For example, it assumes that disabled consumers (or elderly consumers) 
could qualify as being vulnerable, thus acknowledging physical disability; but not 
necessarily those from these groups with high incomes.93 It further explicitly refers to 
“elderly consumers on an extremely low income who may be considered vulnerable 
during a severe winter if they use electricity to heat their homes”,94 thus appreciating 
economic disability. Consumer vulnerability relating to intellectual disability is not 
referred to in the interpretive note, but it is acknowledged in the workings of the 
Vulnerable Consumers Working Group, an initiative launched by the Commission so as 
to establish a better understanding of the drivers of vulnerability and provide 
recommendations. 95 It is the group’s understanding that this type of vulnerability invites 
consumer awareness measures, such as the UK’s ‘energy best deal campaign’ 96 
implemented by the regulator, Ofgem, and consumer empowerment measures, such as the 
provision of information and improved transparency in billing practices to enable 
switching so that reasonable retail energy prices prevail. Price comparison tools have 
also increased in popularity as a means for enabling consumers to find and switch to the 
most appropriate tariff. In addition to individual consumers switching supplier, collective 
switching schemes can also be used to reduce the energy bill for groups of consumers. 
Energy poverty, on the other hand, is linked to lower income only and not to social or 
other characteristics. It has been defined as the inability of consumers to heat their homes 
or enjoy other energy services at an affordable cost.97 One indicator is the expenditure on 
energy compared to the household income that ranges from Member State to Member 
State. To this effect, the Commission has calculated that the lowest income households in 
the EU spent approximately 9% of their income on energy, 50% more than what they 
                                                        
92 Commission Staff Working Paper, “Interpretive note on Directive 2009/72/EC concerning common rules 
for the internal market in electricity and Directive 2009/73/EC concerning common rules for the internal 
market in natural gas – Retail Markets” (Brussels, 22 January 2010). 
93 Ibid at 4.4. 
94 Ibid. 
95 See Vulnerable Consumer Working Group Guidance Document on Vulnerable Consumers (November 
2013) available 
at:<https://ec.europa.eu/energy/sites/ener/files/documents/20140106_vulnerable_consumer_report_0.pdf> 
(last accessed 10 October 2017). 
96 Available at https://www.ofgem.gov.uk/ofgem-publications/38138/energybestdealbookleteng2012-pdf 
(last accessed 10 October 2017) 
97 See ACER and Trinomics (2016), “Selecting Indicators to Measure Energy Poverty”. 
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were paying 10 years ago.98 It concerns affordability, and may invite a more long-term 
preventive approach, not always lying within the market context. For example, the 
amended Directive on the Energy Performance of Buildings includes provisions for 
investments in energy efficient housing that will help tackle energy poverty.99 In the same 
vein, France, Italy and Portugal have put in place specific energy efficiency measures, in 
the form of subsidies and tax reductions for vulnerable consumers.100 
Other targeted measures addressing economic disability involve financial 
interventions through the social welfare system.101 These may be necessary where a high 
percentage of disposable income is needed to cover energy costs, or to address the needs 
of retired and unemployed. Such interventions may include social benefits, tax exemption 
(based on, for example, income or the geographical location of the beneficiaries) and 
direct payments. Tax schemes in particular, such as different energy taxes or exemptions, 
should however be compatible with state aid rules, as should subsidies.  
Economic and/or physical disability may be addressed through price regulation, in the 
form of social tariffs, ensuring that vulnerable consumers can access the most affordable 
energy.102 A number of Member States has implemented such social tariffs. One option is 
to offer progressive tariffs whereby the more energy a consumer uses, the higher the tariff 
he pays. Alternatively some Member States offer lower tariffs for consumers who have a 
high-energy requirement.103 
This section explored how the broader logic of reasonableness translates into the 
different affordability instruments enshrined in the EU energy acquis. It offered a 
taxonomy of these instruments by reference to whether they take place in the market or 
outside the market and their beneficiaries. In this regard, it distinguished between 
measures of general application such as retail price regulation and measures of targeted 
application. It also explored how the tension between the two shades of reasonableness is 
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100 See supra note 95. 
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mediated through the lenses of the ECJ’s “market participation test”. The following 
section will integrate the different instruments for pursuing reasonable prices in al its 
various dimensions and will discuss their respective advantages and disadvantages, as 
there are perceived by EU law to draw some conclusions. 
 
5. The quest for reasonable prices: A comparative assessment of the different 
instruments and its implications for Member States’ practice 
The two shades of reasonableness explored above revealed various instruments for 
achieving reasonable energy prices, as reflected in both its economic and non-economic 
understandings and dimensions. These range from consumer empowerment measures 
deriving from economic understandings of reasonableness and more direct consumer 
protection measures stemming from the conceptualisation of reasonableness as 
affordability. This section aims to draw some conclusions on how the EU framework 
perceives these instruments in a bid to generate insights into the way the it accommodates 
the disparate domestic regulation within the internal energy market and the concomitant 
tension between the two shades of price reasonableness. 
As we already discussed, the EU framework seeks to mediate between the conflicting 
objectives and instruments underlying the two shades of reasonableness by providing 
some broad, albeit strict supervisory rules regarding the nature and degree of domestic 
intervention. Rather than one taking absolute precedence over the other, the two shades 
of reasonableness are in a constant dialectic relationship regulated by the principle of 
proportionally as the latter finds its expression in the ECJ’s “market participation” test. In 
fact, as will be shown below, the latter has provided an overarching normative principle 
prescribing when, how and to what extent reasonableness as affordability should be 
triggered and the specific instruments thereof. The “market participation” principle has 
also been further strengthened in the recently announced “Winter Package”, 104  that 
includes inter alia measures aiming at the increased participation of all consumers, 
including the vulnerable consumers. Four crucial conclusions flow from the closer 
                                                        
104 All documents are published at: <http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposesnew-rules-
consumer-centred-clean-energy-transition> (last visit 10 October 2017). 
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examination of the “market participation test” as a guiding principle for state 
intervention. 
First, the EU’s approach to price reasonableness embarks from the fundamental 
presumption that market forces and competition will deliver ‘reasonable prices’. In both 
the Federutility 105  and the ENEL produzione 106  judgments discussed above the ECJ 
pronounced that the logic, purpose and scheme of the energy liberalisation directives 
requires that retail energy supply prices must be set by the market forces of supply and 
demand. This is the preferred option and overarching objective of liberalised retail energy 
markets. This conclusion is further supported by the strict conditions of necessity and 
proportionality that have to be met before intervening in the retail price setting. 
Second, while not prohibited a priori and not per se illegal, as we explained, retail 
price regulation through PSOs is seen as a ‘second-best’ alternative, pursued to protect 
consumers whenever there is a general interest to be pursued. As advocated by Advocate 
General Colomer: “[T]he objective of preventing undesirable and disproportionate price 
rises which would be detrimental to consumers constitutes grounds for ‘general economic 
interest’ which, provided the directive’s other conditions are met, would justify public 
intervention in respect of prices for the supply of natural gas.”107 However, the “market 
participation” principle points towards strict regulation of such intervention. This is 
because regulated prices impede the development of retail competition by preventing 
market entry from new suppliers and thus reducing consumer’s choice. This is especially 
the case when retail prices are set below costs, i.e. without taking into consideration 
wholesale market prices and other supply costs (i.e. when they are not fully cost-
reflective).108 The Agency for the Cooperation of Energy Regulators (ACER) notes that 
this is the situation in a number of Member States where price-caps exist, as public 
authorities tend to set energy retail prices with greater attention to political considerations 
than to underlying supply costs. 109  Furthermore, artificially low retail prices prompt 
consumers to disengage from the market. 110  Additionally, regulated prices may 
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106 Case C-242/10, ENEL Produzione SpA v Autorita per l’energia elettrica e il gas. 
107 Opinion of A.G. Colomer in C-265/08, Federutility, EU:C:2009:640, para.56. 
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negatively impact the consumers’ propensity to switch. In the same vein, in the “Energy 
Union” communication, the European Commission identified regulated retail prices as an 
obstacle to demand-side participation and retail competition. 111  In fairness, most 
countries with regulated prices have a dual market-structure in place where regulated and 
non-regulated prices coexist. In most cases where this duality exists, regulated prices 
(default tariffs) are available to all household consumers. However, this arrangement still 
impedes competition, as consumers tend to stick with the regulated tariff and do not 
switch to alternative tariffs.112 What is more, the option to switch to market prices still 
does not exist for household electricity and gas consumers in a handful of Member 
States.113 
The bleak picture of national energy markets discussed above brings us to the third 
observation that relates to the strict application of the proportionality requirement. It is 
not sufficient for Member States to verify the existence of public interest, but domestic 
regulation should comply with the principle of proportionality, which implies, as we saw, 
that price regulation should be limited to the price component influenced by the specific 
circumstances, but not to the final end-user’s price. Furthermore, the rationae personae 
limitations of such interventions imply that interventions can only survive when they 
concern targeted, and not blanket, retail price regulation. Thus, the normative guiding 
principle of “market participation” allows the EU to exclude large industrial customers 
from the reach of reasonableness as affordability instruments, subjecting these market 
actors to the default principle of economic reasonableness governed by market 
competition. 
Fourth, delineating the scope of beneficiaries according to their ability to participate 
in the market and act as empowered consumers has crucial ramifications for a number of 
Member States which apply across the board retail price regulation without 
differentiating between household and industrial customers. The latest ACER Market 
Monitoring Report is particularly telling with regard to the pervasiveness of blanket retail 
price regulation: after eight years of full market opening, state regulation for household 
                                                        
111  COM(2015), “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the 
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customers still exists in 12 and 13 countries, respectively.114 In addition, several countries 
have regulated prices for industrial consumers. Following the Court’s judgment in 
Federutility these are now difficult to justify. Furthermore, the Commission has 
expressed its opposition to blanket retail price regulation in several policy documents and 
insists on Member States phasing-out regulated prices, by establishing roadmaps. 115 
Roadmaps should contain clear and attainable steps to establish the necessary conditions 
for a well functioning market where there would be no end-user price regulation. The 
steps taken by the Member States during the transition period should be properly 
monitored at both national and EU levels via notification of the PSO to the Commission. 
Similarly to the Commission, the European Regulators Group for Electricity and Gas 
(“ERGEG”) suggested that end-user price regulation should be either abolished or 
brought into line with market conditions.116 Finally, it is worth briefly mentioning that the 
Commission has also taken action to ensure that prices regulated at a level lower than 
market price do not amount to state aid within the meaning of Article 107(1).117 
Fifth, the “market participation” test as regulated by the proportionality requirement 
allows us to further conclude that retail price regulation should be avoided in the face of a 
less restrictive alternative, such as taxation or social welfare measures. Indeed on 
protecting the vulnerable consumer, the Commission takes a clear stance against retail 
price regulation, while acknowledging the potential need for transitory social tariffs. 
There is a certain appeal on relying solely on social policy. First, such an approach 
safeguards the legitimacy of the NRA, which, as counter-majoritarian institutions, are 
thought to be ill suited in performing redistributive policies. Second, addressing the needs 
of vulnerable consumers outside the market context reduces distortions in market prices. 
Relatedly, it also alleviates the tension that exists between the NRAs competition 
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objective and social objectives, which have gradually brought regulators closer to the 
traditional concerns of government.118 However, this can be criticized on the basis that 
the costs of such policies are to be borne almost entirely by Member States, many of 
which currently face major fiscal constraints. It can also be challenged on the basis of the 
various difficulties that exist in targeting the consumer in need, given the multifaceted 
nature of consumer vulnerability. Regarding the latter, the “Winter Package” contains 
provisions relating to information gathering and dissemination measures to better 
appreciate consumer vulnerability. It is further suggested that Member States shall also 
define a list of indicators for measuring energy poverty as well as monitoring the 
households in energy poverty and report on relevant measures to the Commission every 
two years.119 
The interpretive note on retail markets concedes that social policy and energy policy 
including energy efficiency measures can interact to protect vulnerable customers.120 
However, it clarifies that the intention is not for energy policy to substitute the protection 
of vulnerable consumers through social policy and the measures taken to protect 
consumers through the market must not interfere with either market opening or the 
functioning of the market. This is a quite challenging task, however. First, regulators’ 
duties relating to the protection of vulnerable consumers may be in direct conflict with 
their competition objective. Second, NRA’s governing statutes do not always indicate 
how or to what extent regulators should support vulnerable consumers. An integrated 
approach, whereby social policy interacts with energy policy, aiming at reducing 
consumption and improving efficiency may allow for a more equitable outcome for 
vulnerable consumers. Regarding the latter, the Energy Efficiency Directive specifically 
refers to the need of supporting vulnerable consumers and encourages Member States to 
take it into account when devising energy efficiency obligation schemes and alternative 
measures to achieve energy savings.121 The “Winter Package” also includes proposed 
changes to the Energy Efficiency Directive so as to further empower and protect 
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vulnerable consumers.122 These should be viewed in light of the overall key goal of the 
suggested proposals, namely to enable all consumers to fully participate in the energy 
transition, to manage their consumption, to deliver efficient solutions which save them 
money and to contribute to an overall reduction in energy consumption. 
The abovementioned findings on the significance of the “market participation” 
approach as a useful tool for mediating between the two shades of reasonableness 
enshrined in the EU energy acquis are somewhat reflected in the recently announced 
“Winter Package”. Besides the Commission’s commitment to completely phase out 
regulated prices in the new energy market design, most interestingly, the Recast Directive 
on common rules for the internal market in electricity 123  goes a step further and 
reconsiders the relevance and scope of affordability instruments, such as the PSOs 
relating to the price of supply. In particular, it is strongly suggested that PSOs in the form 
of supply price regulation supply should no longer be pursued by Member States as their 
effects blatantly reflect those of blanket retail price regulation. 124  On the contrary, 
“Member States should apply other policy tools, and in particular targeted social policy 
measures, to safeguard the affordability of electricity supply to their citizens”125 with 
price regulation being applied “in limited exceptional circumstances”.126 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
The article advanced the proposition that exploring what constitutes a reasonable price 
for energy in the current paradigm of liberalisation is a necessary precondition for 
assessing the appropriateness, nature and conditions of state intervention in retail energy 
prices. By distinguishing between the notion of reasonableness in light of the market 
competition objective and reasonableness as affordability, the article brought into greater 
focus the various instruments that are enshrined in the energy directives for pursuing 
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reasonable prices; not necessarily exhausted in retail price regulation. Consumer 
empowerment measures can and should also be relied upon to deliver reasonable prices, 
especially in light of the anticipated “consumer centred clean energy transmission” 
announced in the Commission’s “Winter Package”. The article also examined the 
respective advantages and disadvantages of all the different measures envisioned by the 
EU energy acquis from the point of view of the EU framework and showed how the 
tensions between the two shades of reasonableness are accommodated in the broader EU 
constitutional and institutional context. In doing so it elaborated on the “market 
participation” principle implicitly put forward by the ECJ in a bid to guide the Member 
States as to when and how they should intervene in the process of competition. 
Despite the renewed emphasis on consumer empowerment in the Commission’s 
rhetoric, the old and still on-going battle between the Commission and the Member 
States127  around the scope and conditions of retail price regulation forms a nagging 
reminder of the contradictions that exist within the EU’s commitment to “open and 
undistorted competition” in essential services such as energy supply. Economic 
understandings of price reasonableness underpinned by economic efficiency 
considerations cannot alone and/or always guarantee “reasonable prices”. However, the 
various social concerns underpinning understandings of reasonableness as affordability 
are mostly national in origin and may contribute to a further fragmentation of national 
energy markets putting the overall objective of an internal energy market at risk. The way 
EU law attempts to reconcile and resolve the tension between the two shades of 
reasonableness reflects pragmatic considerations about the plurality of interests, goals 
and values pursued in manufacturing an EU energy markets. These make it highly 
unlikely that a single shade of price reasonableness will ever prevail. Nonetheless, before 
resorting to interventionist measures, Member States should be guided by a better 
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understanding of the two shades of reasonableness and their concomitant consumer 
empowerment and consumer protection measures, as brought forward in this article. 
Otherwise, retail price regulation is likely to remain a persistent “anachronism”128 in the 
EU’ liberalised retail energy market. 
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